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 If one wanted to look for fascism in 1930s Japan, 
exhibitions would be a good place to start. Mass spectacle, it 
is clear, was a political priority in Fascist Italy.1 The 
repeated commemorations of the March on Rome, the monumental 
staging of the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, the 
mass kinaesthetics of 18 BL in the same year (an experimental 
theatrical performance celebrating and starring the first 
truck mass-produced by Fiat), and the plans for the 
Esposizione Universale di Roma (EUR) in 1942 were all state 
projects. They were designed to ensure that their audience 
would identify with the nation, in the person of Mussolini, 
and so produce a new fascist subject, which the revolution had 
promised and on which the regime would be based. In each case, 
an architectural sanctum enabled a processional sacrament. By 
rehearsing in material form the ideological tropes and 
revolutionary narrative of the movement through which the 
regime had come to power, they promised to transform the 
spectator into willing participant, both actor within the 
spectacle itself and acted upon by their viewing of the event. 
The epiphanic abolition of the usual distance between viewer 
and viewed would produce an ecstatic union with leader and so 
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regime. Nor was Nazi Germany slow to recognize the potential 
of such events. Nuremburg rallies and Berlin Olympics, not 
least in Leni Riefenstahl’s filmic representations, have long 
been recognized as one key to understanding that regime.  
 Fascists were not alone in their enthusiasm for spectacle, 
however, nor were Italy and Germany the only countries to 
exhibit signs of fascism. Great exhibitions had long been used 
by states to mediate the shock of the new, whose iteration and 
amplitude following the First World War were fast becoming 
insufferable. As Harry Harootunian has noted, the interwar 
crisis of capitalism was a global one, fracturing everyday 
convention and traditional certainties throughout the world. 
Fascism therefore took its place among a number of proposed 
solutions that promised “capitalism without capitalism,” that 
is, the liberating modernity that capitalism enabled without 
the corrosive externalities that it had also produced. 
Envisioning this alternative was the work of culture, which 
could conjure a foundation upon which to reestablish the sense 
of identity and community that had been set adrift. Fascist 
culture shared many of its own panaceas with other visionaries. 
Given the anxieties of the time, it is not surprising to find 
a recurring and general preference for community over 
individual, nature over history, and form over content, nor to 
discover Japanese thinkers among those who sought indigenous 
solutions to the global crisis.2  
 In conjuring up mythic pasts or possible futures for 
popular consumption, however, cultural producers everywhere 
had to confront the present absence of the desired alternative. 
The imagined community could not be assumed, but had to be 
represented; spectacle promised to do so in style. The French 
and Americans were quick to turn again to exhibitions after 
the First World War, while Los Angeles in 1932 provided the 
blueprint for a modern Olympics, which Hitler sought to build 
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four years later in Berlin.3 The fascist regimes in Germany 
and Italy were innovators, overcoming the inherently diffuse 
nature of mass spectacle by disciplining the narrative, 
regimenting the audience, and animating the display, as noted 
above. But the benefits of such total environments were 
obvious and quickly sought elsewhere. The 1939-40 New York 
World’s Fair sought to produce a world of tomorrow, nowhere 
more than in General Motors’ Futurama, which rapt its audience 
with a panorama of the automobilized future. Fifteen years 
later, fair and pavilion inspired the creation of Disneyland, 
wherein imagined worlds were enclosed for good. No less than 
fascist mass spectacle, the capitalist version sought to 
incorporate spectators in a world from which uncertainty had 
been banished; abolishing the distance between viewer and 
viewed not only removed the consumer from the anxieties of the 
present, but encouraged him or her to buy the trademarked 
future on display.4 
 Generalized anxiety, common solutions, and the use of 
spectacle were not by themselves enough to make the icons of 
American corporate culture fascist. Emphasizing commonalities 
and genealogies in this way suggests only the extent to which 
the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy shared their context, 
preoccupations, and some procedures with others at the time. 
Put differently, fascism did not arise beyond the modern pale; 
the potential for fascism was not limited to the countries 
that would later become an Axis, or to the 1930s. Only in 
Italy and Germany, however, did fascism progress, from 
potential to proclivity, ideology, movement, and finally 
regime. Analyzing fascism requires both that we acknowledge 
the potential, but also mark the differences that 
characterized the progression. Here too spectacle is useful. 
On the one hand, fascist culture inflected familiar themes in 
distinctive ways, emphasizing particular solutions to the 
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common problems of the present. Nature, community, and nation 
were to be restored by a rupture with the immediate, 
degenerate past; the recovery of a founding national endowment; 
the identification of the nation with its heroic leader; and 
an ongoing militarization through which a new national subject 
might be forged.5 On the other, fascist regimes, as noted 
above, were distinguished by the extent to which the 
production of culture became the work of the state, rehearsing 
these tropes in an attempt to yoke subject to regime.6 
Spectacle is therefore one point at which to connect fascist 
culture to fascist politics. 
 It is hard to find such a spectacle in Japan, however. In 
what follows, I want to use the small story of an exhibition 
that did not take place, in order to mark the difference 
between Italian and German solutions to the interwar crisis 
and what was happening in Japan in the 1930s. The Japan World 
Exhibition to commemorate the 2600th year of the Imperial Era 
(Kigen 2600 nen Kinen Nihon Bankoku Hakurankai, hereafter 
Banpaku) was planned for 1940, to take place on a couple of 
reclaimed islands in Tokyo Bay. Together with the Olympics, it 
was to be the centerpiece of a range of events commemorating 
the anniversary of the putative ascension of Jimmu, the first 
emperor, to the chrysanthemum throne in 660 BCE (hereafter 
Kigen 2600). Banpaku and Olympics were both cancelled in the 
summer of 1938 in the wake of the invasion of China, but until 
then, the exhibition fit easily enough with the rhetoric and 
initiatives that affirmed Japan’s increasingly strident self-
identity and place in the world.7 In retrospect, too, it has 
proved easy enough to fold it into a familiar narrative about 
the dark valley of early Showa Japan. Banpaku, like most of 
the decade, can be seen to have lead to war, Axis, and 
inevitable defeat. The teleology is tempting, collapsing the 
exhibition and the decade as a whole into the tale of an 
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omnipotent state, exploiting the fascist potential in a 
society under economic siege in order to build an 
authoritarian, if never quite fascist, regime.8 But it is 
wrong.  
 A close analysis reveals that this exhibition attracted 
interest and investment not because it promised to forge a 
fascist subject, but because it could seem, albeit with some 
effort, to be all things to all people. That is, the 
exhibition was one of many ways in which Imperial Japan, 
almost until its end, could provide a sufficiently inclusive 
imaginary space, inscribed on an appropriately expansive 
physical area, to accommodate radically diverse, even 
ideologically opposed, interests. As such, it may also suggest 
some broader conclusions for our understanding of Japan in the 
1930s, and of the place of fascism within it. Japan certainly 
shared in the general anxieties of the time, but for solutions 
it was able for the most part to draw on older configurations 
of ideology, institutions, and initiative. It may be that 
these were enough, in the end, to achieve similar results to 
those achieved by fascist regimes: the mobilization that was 
possible under conditions of total war and the uses that were 
eventually made of the anniversary both suggest affinities 
between Japan and its Axis allies.9 The differences in the 
process by which they arrived at these solutions, however, as 
well as similarities between Axis and Allied representation 
and practice suggest that we need to widen the frame, and 
place at least this exhibition, but also Japan, and even 
perhaps fascism itself within a more general, if no less 
troubling, history of modern political economy, as well as 
mass spectacle. 
 
Origins Narratives and Imperial Destiny 
 The theme of the exhibition was a predictable one. As 
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summarized in the official prospectus, the exhibition promised 
to “humbly commemorate the 2600th year of the imperial era by 
gathering and displaying the flower of industry from home and 
abroad, and so contribute to the fusion of cultures east and 
west, the development of global industry, and the advance of 
international peace.”10 This was elaborated elsewhere in the 
promotional literature to reaffirm a set of relationships 
between ancient national history, recent modern 
accomplishments, the contemporary international situation, and 
future global prospects. The ritual invocation of four-
character slogans served to underwrite an evolutionary account 
of national destiny, but one which sought to banish the 
possibility of change over time, and so confirm the self-
identity of the Japanese nation and its historical mission.11  
 The starting point was Jimmu’s accession to the 
“imperial” throne. The mythical first monarch had thus planted 
the “seed” not only of the Japanese people (ikkun banmin) and 
their “unsurpassed” national spirit, but also of Japan’s 
successful recent modernization.12 The present was thus the 
“autumn,” industrial development and international standing 
the fall crop of Jimmu’s initial planting, the inevitable 
fruit of the original spiritual endowment, guaranteed by the 
unbroken imperial line (bansei ikkei).13 Finally, the organic 
unfolding of the national genetic code would itself bring 
about international harmony (bankoku kyôwa)—sometimes glossed 
as the infamous “eight corners of the world under one roof” 
(hakkô ichiu)—which was both the spiritual core of the 
founding (chôkoku no seishin) and therefore the national faith 
(kokumin no shinnen).14 All that was required, and the goal of 
the exhibition, was to reaffirm the basic principles of their 
national destiny to the Japanese people, and to reveal the 
true meaning and pacific nature of that destiny to the world 
at large.15 
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 The theme was susceptible to any number of variations. 
One of the most elaborate was the lyrics of the official 
exhibition march, published in March 1938. 
 
At the dawn  of a young Asia, 
A new Japan  with bright life. 
Look!    Piercing the ages 
The essence  of Japanese spirit 
 Gorgeously unfolds today. 
 The Japan International Exhibition. 
 
Three more stanzas elaborated the lesson, invoking familiar 
symbols (“pure Yamato cherry,” “graceful Fuji”) to anchor the 
“pure history” and “great mission” of a nonetheless “young 
Japan.”16 Again, an unfolding but unchanging essence, 
buttressed by nature and seasonal metaphors, served to anchor 
Japan’s place at the center of Asia and modernity.  
 Much of the rhetorical content here was shared with the 
slightly later promotion of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Rather than rehearse the iterations of Japan’s 
imperial destiny, however, and damn the exhibition by 
rhetorical association, it seems more useful to unpick the 
thoroughly generic form—the very model of a modern national 
narrative—that structures the particular Japanese content. 
Briefly, such a narrative begins by assuming a point of 
(divine) origin freed from the contingencies of the historical 
environment. This assumption of autopoesis allows subsequent 
historical experience to be rewritten as the inevitable self-
realization of a genetically programmed destiny: one studies 
the past to anticipate the future.17 Temporal and spatial 
distinctions are collapsed: the articulation of organism and 
its environment and the resulting change over time are 
characterized as the extension across time and space of the 
Lockyer, Expo Fascism?  8 
unchanging, self-same code and so the heroic yet effortless 
creation of a world by the organism. Thus the Exhibition’s 
President, Ushitsuka Kotarô, could note that the absorption of 
western science and civilization since the beginning of 
Japan’s rapid modernization in the Meiji period (1868-1912) 
was in fact the realization of the essence of Japan’s own 
spirit and culture.18 The origins narrative, sustained often by 
a metaphor of seasonal transformation, subsumes difference, 
both within and without, under Japan, naturalized as the world. 
Modern Japanese development is not understood as the outcome 
of an intricate pattern of interaction with the contemporary 
world; rather, a world of international harmony will result 
from the natural development of the Japanese empire.  
 Such an origins narrative was hardly unique to Japan. It 
differed little from the autobiographies of almost all 
imperial powers, in which the imagined distinction of the 
modern nation authorized manifest destiny and civilizing 
mission. Nationalism imagined a unitary identity (a spiritual 
essence, great culture, pure history) not only as a means of 
defense in a competitive international system, but also in 
order to transcend the differentiated interest of a pluralist, 
capitalist society. International competition and capitalist 
interest, however, both ensured that identity and system were 
expansive. The universal pretensions of a civilizing mission 
prescribed what was profitable for some as good, if not yet to 
be implemented, for all. Here was one difference with the 
distinctive posture of fascist rhetoric. Where the latter 
began with rupture (from both past and world), demanded 
personification, expelled difference, and generalized violence, 
imperial nationalism asserted continuity, abstracted 
personality, incorporated difference, and tended, at least in 
rhetoric, to peace.19 This is not to argue that either set of 
attributes should be read as the truth of their respective 
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regimes. But it is to claim that the ideological means toward 
their acquisitive ends were distinctive. 
 It also suggests that both rhetoric and exhibition need 
to be understood within a longer history. Nowhere were the 
projections and evasions of modern nationalism on more obvious 
display than the international exhibitions of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Delusional patriotism and imperial 
destiny were their stock-in-trade. The Philadelphia Centennial 
exhibition of 1876, the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1889, 
and the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893 all sought to tie 
universal aspirations to national commemoration. Nor had Japan 
been slow to explore the possibilities of their newly invented 
imperial tradition. Unrealized plans for an international 
exhibition in 1890 had also exploited the putative ascension 
of the first emperor, although in that case the anniversary 
had been the 2550th. Late Victorian bombast and national 
origins were less obvious by the interwar period, but both the 
United States and France continued to insist on their imperial 
birthright and civilizing influence, even as the focus shifted 
to tomorrow’s worlds and modern art.20 In other words, the 
constructed and contradictory nature of such narratives may 
have been more apparent in Japan in the 1930s, but the latter 
still relied on the conventions of the form. 
 
Material Form and Commemorative Space 
 In the linear prose of public relations and official 
statements, exhibition organizers and supporters could have 
recourse to time-honored tropes and a familiar rhetorical 
structure. Origins narratives provided a simple solution for 
bridging particular and universal, by collapsing distinctions, 
absorbing contradiction, and so freeing the thereby imagined 
community from any temporal or spatial specificity. It is not 
surprising that problems came when the rhetoric was obliged to 
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take specific material form, as two-dimensional graphics or 
three-dimensional architecture. The rhetorical sleight of hand 
afforded by narrative, reading modern science as ancient 
destiny, for example, could not be sustained in more stable 
media, wherein signifiers were valuable precisely for the 
specificity of their historical and cultural reference. The 
contradictions inherent in reconciling Japan and the world, 
the effort required to do so, and the ambivalence of the final 
result, were apparent at every stage of the process. 
 The basic outlines of the problem were apparent in the 
jury responsible for choosing the official exhibition posters. 
Its discussion of the submissions was bedeviled by an 
uncertainty as to whether the design chosen should express the 
“spirit of the age,” emphasizing the exhibition’s 
international dimensions, or the “spirit of the founding,” 
highlighting its commemorative nature. A degree of interaction 
with the outside world, coded as “westernization,” seemed 
unavoidable: many of the posters copied foreign examples, and 
the Chinese characters used on all the posters were 
unambiguously modern. In the end, the jury was saved by being 
able to reward and recommend the dissemination of several 
posters. The winners were united in suggesting that they had 
sought to produce something uniquely Japanese (“Nihon-teki 
toiu koto,” “Nihon dokuji no kanji o dashitai”), although 
their designs ran the gamut, from a decidedly futurist dove 
carrying a globe belted with 2600 in a sling of national flags 
to a white Mt. Fuji, floating on a red ground, with a bird 
flying across its face. The first prize must have seemed a 
safe bet, finally going to a portrayal of an ancient Japanese 
warrior standing facing out over an expansive plain. Even here, 
however, one of the jurors suggested that there was no way of 
knowing whether or not he was standing in Japan, or perhaps 
the whole universe.21 
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 The poster competition revealed a simple version of the 
problem that was by now wracking design in general, 
architecture above all, and that caught the exhibition 
authorities in a multiple bind. On the one hand, the ascent of 
international modernism had rejected cultural specificity in 
favor of universal form. On the other, rising nationalism, not 
least among the bureaucrats responsible for overseeing 
architectural competitions, demanded a more identifiably 
Japanese architecture, especially on those occasions where 
Japan itself was on display. Fascist architects in Germany and 
Italy resolved a similar dilemma by framing the functional 
imperatives of modernism within the dictates of neo-classical 
style. Japanese architecture in the 1930s also saw an updating 
of tradition, known as Nihon shumi (Japanese taste), which 
involved the use of traditional Japanese elements to ornament 
modern building construction. But where fascists could pass 
off their atavism as the heir of earlier developments, and 
therefore an embodiment of genuine modernity, the Japanese 
reversion to type marked itself as a throwback to tradition 
defined against the modern, an embrace of the particular 
against the universal.22 The problem was particularly acute 
given this particular context. The anniversary demanded a 
visual rubric that was clearly Japanese, but an international 
exhibition had to incorporate the world.  
 The solution came in two parts, combining architectural 
style and site planning. First, the authorities determined 
that a Memorial Hall should anchor the site as a whole. The 
regulations for the prize competition stipulated that the hall 
was the “main sign” of the exhibition and therefore its style 
should be “sublime and majestic, symbolizing the Japanese 
spirit.”23 After ruminations as tortured as those of the poster 
committee, the judges finally picked a design by Takanashi 
Katsushige, who explained his entry as “pure Japanese 
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architecture,” an attempt to modernize the Sumiyoshi style, 
the oldest of the “globally incomparable” traditions of shrine 
architecture. Sano Toshikata, the chairman of the judges, 
noted that the architects’ task had been a difficult one, the 
traces of the struggle visible in the variety of submissions, 
which had mimicked castles and temples, as well as shrines. 
The simplicity of the latter model had carried the day, 
however. The great staircase, pillars, and roof combined 
elegance and dignity.24 Inside the hall, frescoes would 
recreate the scene at the accession of Jimmu, and the 
subsequent development of the Japanese people from ancient 
times to the present.25  
 Where the Memorial Hall could solve the puzzle by 
divorcing steel-frame structure and throwback style, the site 
plan had to resort to disaggregation. The site as a whole was 
subject to strict considerations of symmetry and style. Early 
plans had the exhibition occupying four reclaimed islands at 
the mouth of the Sumida river, but the final site comprised 
only two (present-day Toyosu and Harumi), together with a 
small subsidiary site devoted to marine-related exhibits in 
Yokohama.26 An artist’s impression with accompanying commentary, 
spread over four pages of the official magazine, suggested the 
architectural panorama that would unfurl before the visitor. 
He or she would approach the main gate as if visiting a shrine. 
Beyond it sat the Memorial Hall, a modern rendition of the 
most ancient of Japanese architectures. To its right were 
halls relating to “spirit and culture” (including Society, 
Health and Hygiene, Education, and the Arts), to its left 
exhibits of industry and natural resources (including Mining, 
Engineering, and Communication and Transportation). The island 
would be unified throughout by a “sublime” Japanese 
architecture, before yielding to a miscellany of exhibits and 
facilities on the second, executed in a “free, modern” 
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architectural style, and including Agriculture, Chemical and 
Manufacturing Industries, the Foreign Pavilion, various 
entertainments, and parking. The exhibition’s unique synthesis 
of East and West would further underwrite Japan’s claims to 
possibly global and certainly Asian leadership.27 
 The plans as a whole neatly recapitulated the 
characteristic tropes of generic exhibition design. 
International exhibitions had early outgrown the original 
single-building model of the Crystal Palace in 1851. By the 
late 19th century, the movement had developed a standard 
repertoire: central axes, spatial symmetry, and officially-
endorsed, historically-pedigreed architecture for the most 
important buildings, as the standard against which foreign 
styles were set off. By the 1930s, architectural style had 
moved on, but the other principles remained. They were ideally 
suited to accommodate the evolutionary and imperial principles 
that still informed such exhibitions, the spatial embodiment 
of the narrative structure outlined above. Narrative and 
exhibition might begin with a statement of national origins, 
but quickly moved on to provide a panorama of the world beyond 
the nation. This was far removed from the national sacrament 
for which fascist architecture was designed. There, the 
original covenant was reaffirmed by creating a sanctum, 
excluding the world, and choreographing space and time as a 
processional, which would culminate in the ecstatic union of 
subject with leader and so the state.28 In Tokyo, on the other 
hand, site plan and architecture had to incorporate rather 
than exclude, making space for multiple ways of representing 
the world and, perhaps most importantly, experiencing the 
exhibition. 
 International exhibitions, in other words, were as much 
about pragmatics as ideology. Nowhere is this clearer than in 
the discussions of the Site Planning Committee, which began 
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meeting in January 1937.29 Later meetings of the committee 
touched on questions of representation and style, but much of 
this labor could be delegated, or sub-contracted, to juried 
competitions. The committee began with the study of blueprints 
from Paris and Chicago, and spent much of its time shuttling 
backwards and forwards between visitor numbers and site plans, 
tinkering with plans to maximize numbers, and extrapolating 
from numbers to address the question of how people were going 
to get to and move around the exhibition.30 The most basic 
imperative in site planning was traffic flow and crowd control, 
important enough to spawn a separate transportation committee 
and to produce the only permanent legacy from the exhibition, 
the Kachidoki bridge linking Tsukiji on the mainland, 
southeast of the Imperial Palace, to the reclaimed islands on 
which the exhibition would be staged.31 This constraint also 
meant that the artist’s impression would remain just that. 
There were multiple possible entrances to the exhibition, 
including one that led straight into the amusement zone on the 
second island. After this, and the novelties of the foreign 
exhibits, the unique architectural synthesis of the first 
island may perhaps have seemed merely antiquarian, its 
orchestrating symmetry didactic and dry.  
 At the most general level, in other words, planning for 
the exhibition betrayed the awareness that an exhibition had 
to work to attract people, that attractions at an exhibition 
therefore had to be adequately differentiated, and that its 
audience had to be accounted for. There could not be only one 
route around the exhibition, and there would certainly not be 
only one kind of visitor. As ideology and representation 
confronted the lessons of experience, in other words, the 
exhibition entered the world of trade-offs, accounting, and 
interest. 
 
Lockyer, Expo Fascism?  15 
Interest Aggregation and Numbers Games 
 What is most striking about this and other exhibitions in 
Japan during the 1930s, as well as the initial plans for the 
imperial anniversary, is that they were not state projects. In 
the 1870s, the early Meiji state had embraced exhibitions as a 
central initiative in its efforts to promote industry, but its 
initiatives at home had been quickly supplemented and soon 
replaced. By the turn of the century municipal governments had 
turned to exhibitions for urban development and renewal, while 
the emerging consumer industry seized on them following the 
First World War as a powerful medium for commercial 
expansion.32 This combination, of local government, business 
interest, and an emerging exhibition industry, was the context 
for the original plans for 1940. In 1926 a consortium of local 
politicians, industrialists, and exhibition promoters came 
together to form an Exhibition Club. Three years later it was 
this group that first proposed an international exhibition, to 
be held in 1935, as a way of attracting exhibitors, visitors, 
and above all capital to a local economy still reeling from 
the aftershocks of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. The 
initial discussions ran aground in 1931, but the initiative 
reemerged the following year as the locally-organized 
centerpiece of a government-supervised celebration of the 
imperial anniversary. The lead advocate was Sakatani Yoshiô, a 
former Minister of Finance and Mayor of Tokyo, and with his 
energetic promotion and extensive connections, the proposal 
took off.33 
 The imperial anniversary provided an ideal opportunity 
for such an event. As suggested above, national commemoration 
had long proved a profitable rationale for international 
exhibitions, precisely because of its ability to satisfy 
diverse imperatives: national prestige and international 
respectability; local development and business opportunity; 
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foreign tourism and popular entertainment. On the one hand, 
given this particular occasion, it is no surprise that the 
exhibition employed much of the rhetoric through which the 
population was mobilized for empire and, eventually, war. On 
the other, the capacious structure of that vocabulary, 
suggested above, could bear multiple investments, by private 
entrepreneurs as well as state ideologues.34 The concerns of 
capital were indifferent to the putative content of the brands 
through which it sought a return on investment, and the 
opportunity of an imperial anniversary promised a higher than 
usual rate of return.35 To understand how it did so, however, 
requires turning from words to numbers. In pitching the 1940 
event, it was the latter that were paramount, but the same 
figures could be cut differently for different audiences. At 
the national level, organizers explained how the exhibition 
would benefit the national balance of payments, generating at 
least half as much foreign currency as textiles, Japan’s 
leading export, but at twice the profit rate.36 To regional 
audiences, however, they emphasized the influx of capital to 
the Kantô economy, relying on the example of Paris in 1889 to 
suggest that the exhibition would generate 27 times its own 
budget for local businesses.37 
 At the same time, the fact that the brand was an imperial 
one, and the possibility of monopolizing its value, guaranteed 
that the battle for marketing rights was a keen one. Sakatani 
and the Federation were not alone in producing visions of 
Kigen 2600. As early as October 1933, there were reports of 
plans by the Home, Education, Army, and Navy Ministries for a 
“great national festival” commemorating the anniversary as a 
way of “overcoming the emergency.”38 The Home Ministry, in 
particular, was a persistent critic of any aspect of the 
exhibition that might detract from the solemnity it believed 
appropriate to the commemoration of the nation’s founding. The 
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advance guard of these concerns was the Japan Culture 
Association (Nihon Bunka Renmei), which had been formed in 
1933 by Matsumoto Manabu, a Home Ministry bureaucrat, and 
which soon sought to promote an alternative vision of the 
anniversary. In January 1936, the Association proposed a 
survey of Japanese culture together with four other projects, 
and a year later published a comprehensive “Outline of 
Publicity Policy for Kigen 2600.”39 However, despite the 
organization’s efforts, only the survey, of the five projects, 
was taken up by the government, its authorized budget of 1 
million yen only a third of that initially proposed, and 
dwarfed by the expected 50 million yen cost of the exhibition. 
Although the Ministry of Education did subsidize the Japan 
Culture Association, the latter remained on the periphery of 
the official plans for Kigen 2600, for which the exposition 
and the Olympics remained the centerpiece.  
 The Home Ministry and its allies were able to gain more 
leverage, though never the upper hand, by translating their 
concerns into the budgetary language of the exhibition’s 
promoters. Financing an exhibition was never easy. Other 
decisions could be made in-house, but an international 
exhibition always required government funding, implying trade-
offs with other bureaucratic interests, and so providing an 
opening for possible compromise. In his 1932 proposal, 
Sakatani had emphasized that the success of earlier 
international exhibitions, notably at Paris in 1900, had 
rested in large part on advance ticket sales, which could 
finance the substantial expenses that fell due before the 
exhibition opened. In order to get potential visitors to buy 
tickets in advance, however, there had to be some incentive. A 
lottery seemed ideal.40 Over time, however, this proposal ran 
into problems, with the Home Ministry leading the charge 
against the damage that speculation would do to the national 
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spirit.41 The Association counterattacked, using the pages of 
the official magazine to claim that the exhibition itself was 
Jimmu’s dying wish. The rhetoric was eye-catching, but the 
Home Ministry was fighting a rearguard action. In the cabinet 
and government committees the lottery had been accepted as a 
fait accompli, with the point at issue being how far in 
advance the tickets should be sold and the financial value of 
the prizes. The debate rumbled on for another year, but all 
parties finally and predictably agreed to meet somewhere in 
the middle, the Diet passing the necessary law in August 1937. 
In March 1938, the first one million advance tickets were sold, 
many seemingly swept up in the dreaded speculative “fever,” 
and in May the prize winners were announced. Among the ten 
first prize winners, each of whom received 2,000 yen, was 
Sakatani, who immediately assured reporters that he would 
donate his prize to the Celebration Committee.42 
 The lottery was not the only issue on which entertainment 
and industry had to compromise with commemoration. In February 
1938, the President of the Exhibition spoke to the Tokyo City 
Council. He began by noting that while previous exhibitions 
had always had an aristocrat or bureaucrat as their President, 
the government had realized that this exhibition required the 
experience of the private sector. He then turned to numbers, 
citing the economic impact of the Chicago fair in 1933. His 
audience could expect the same of Banpaku. Given the war in 
China, they predicted only half the normal number of foreign 
visitors, but nonetheless the exhibition could be expected to 
generate 355 million yen in demand for the region. The number 
might be even higher, if the exhibition could do what it 
wanted: special theme days and a slew of entertainments would 
certainly attract the crowds. But given the solemn 
significance of Kigen 2600, it would be difficult to make the 
exhibition as lively as one might want. Entertainment had to 
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be kept within limits, and so, perhaps, the exhibition’s 
attraction would be limited. Still, he promised, it would be a 
success.43 
  
Conclusion 
 In the end, of course, national concerns trumped global 
outreach. On July 15, 1938, the cabinet announced that the 
exhibition, together with the Tokyo Olympics, were to be 
postponed indefinitely. At this point, Japanese essence proved 
incompatible with international affairs: material and meaning 
were restricted, devoted to the prosecution of the war. But 
while it was eventually swept away by the Japanese invasion of 
China, it is important not to subsume the exhibition within a 
narrative governed by that aggression. Until then, Kigen 2600 
imposed limits, but it was not yet enough to overwhelm or even 
transform the exhibition itself. The latter, I have argued, 
needs to be understood not primarily in terms of a state 
mobilizing a nation for war, but in terms of a local economy 
seeking investment and recovery through the proven medium of 
international exhibition. From the late 19th century, 
exhibitions had been adept at reconciling private, local, and 
state interests, putting national history and imperial destiny 
alongside modern industry and popular attraction. Like the 
origins narratives and capitalist economies of the empires in 
which they took shape, exhibitions could accommodate any 
number of players, providing some basic rules but requiring 
only a sufficiently expansive area within which to resolve the 
inevitable contradictions. The exhibition planned for Tokyo in 
1940 was no different.44  
 In this light, the planning for the exhibition also 
suggests some broader conclusions for our understanding of 
Japan in the 1930s. Fascism may help us identify certain 
features of cultural production during that time, the clarity 
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of whose constellation in Italy and Germany reveal both their 
utility in covering the fractured nature of contemporary 
experience and the eagerness with which they were also adopted 
elsewhere. Fascist culture, however, differs in key 
particulars from the emphases evident in the rhetoric 
surrounding at least the initial plans for the imperial 
anniversary. Moreover, analyses of fascist culture alone 
cannot explain how and why aesthetics and ideology could 
become regime. Spectacle suggests one way in which fascist 
culture was linked to politics, but again marks the difference 
between contemporary developments in Japan and the countries 
that would later become its allies. Rather than using fascism 
to mark Japan as exceptional, therefore, and so confine it to 
an Axis that was yet to appear, it may be more useful to 
emphasize the extent to which developments in Japanese 
political economy, society, and culture during the 1930s were 
similar to those elsewhere in the world.  
 Two patterns seem significant here. The first dates to 
the late nineteenth-century world of industry and empire, of 
which international exhibitions were one self-congratulatory 
expression. Here, origins narratives justified hierarchy as 
the consequence of progress, rather than conflict and conquest, 
scripting development as the outcome of unique endowments and 
singular histories. As imperial commemoration, then, Banpaku 
echoed familiar themes, providing grandiose justification for 
municipal initiative and business interest. Japan in the 1930s, 
by this account, was a particular blend of a familiar brew, of 
capitalist economy, differentiated society, and imperial 
polity, with its distinctive notes of nationalist bombast and 
exceptionalism. At the same time, however, a second pattern 
was emerging, born in large part of the consequences of the 
first. Globally, colonial nationalism was beginning to throw 
the rules of the imperial club into question, while socialism 
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refused to accept the distributions of capital. Domestically, 
economic dislocation and social unrest provided the incentive 
and 1929 the opportunity for massive, unprecedented state 
intervention in the economy, ranging from Stalinist planning 
through Rooseveltian New Deal to fascist corporatism. This 
second pattern is also faintly visible in the planning of the 
exhibition, as local response to the dilemmas of uneven 
development.  
 Here, however, Banpaku points for the most part past 1945.  
Given the economy’s relative resilience in the early 30s and 
subsequent subordination to the unproductive demands of total 
war, the full-blown emergence of the developmentalist state 
had to wait until after the war, unlike its welfare 
counterparts in Europe and the US.45 When it did arrive, 
however, exhibitions were again part of the arsenal of 
development, milled by the bureaucrats of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry. The early postwar reiterated 
the prewar pattern, the state concentrating its efforts 
overseas, through the newly minted Japan External Trade 
Organization, and municipalities and newspapers seizing on 
exhibitions as a catalyst for recovery. By the 1960s, however, 
in the wake of liberalization, the government had to 
supplement export promotion with domestic demand. Big events 
became the means of choice not only to prime the economic pump, 
but to provide the social capital with which to plan 
development, and so even out the concentrations and 
distortions of unprecedented economic growth.46  
 In this sense, Tokyo’s plans for 1940 came to fruition in 
the 1964 Olympics and the 1970 Osaka Expo.47 Given the 
innovations in mass spectacle during the 1930s and 40s, it was 
no surprise that the former took precedence. But while the 
Olympics transformed the capital, it was the Expo that got 
people on to the new bullet trains, leading to a national 
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campaign to Discover Japan and a boom in domestic and 
international tourism.48 The 64,218,770 visitors to the Senri 
Hills in the summer of 1970, 15 billion yen in profit, and the 
estimated 1.244 billion yen that Expo generated in demand 
suggests the Exhibition Club may well have been on the right 
track in the 1930s.49 Prewar nationalism and imperial bombast 
may have been absent, but broader continuities remained. An 
evolutionary theme, “Progress and Harmony for Mankind,” 
together with an expansive site, still proved able to 
accommodate not only the diverse interests of national and 
corporate exhibitors, but even the Cold War rivalry of the U.S. 
and USSR. Expo 70 may not have been an exact replica of its 
predecessor, but anyone who still had their tickets from the 
Tokyo event was welcome to use them in Osaka, thirty years 
after the fact. Given the similarities between the two events, 
it was perhaps only appropriate that the backers of 
development should see some return on their investment. 
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